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1. Introduction 
In the Myth of Er at the end of Plato’s Republic, we are permitted to pick from many forms of life 
for our return to the world. The order in which we are permitted to choose is given to us by lot 
(necessity), but our judgment is displayed by our choice of reincarnated form (virtue, or the lack 
thereof).1 
Plato uses a narrative within a narrative to show the limitations of polities governed by 
substantial knowledge of the good. The person blessed with the first choice of lives in the 
netherworld was similarly blessed on earth by citizenship in the best of regimes. Both blessings 
were conferred on him by chance and not merit. Er recounts that even given the fortune of a good 
education and happiness on earth due to participation in the best regime, and the opportunity to 
choose first among all souls, this person makes the worst choice. He “immediately chose the 
greatest tyranny, and due to folly and gluttony, chose without having considered everything 
adequately; and it escaped his own notice that eating his own children and other evils were fated 
to be a part of that life.”2 Even though he was “one of those who had come from heaven, having 
lived in an orderly regime,” he participated in virtue only through “habit” and not by 
understanding. In fact, “not the least number of those” who chose tyranny came from such regimes, 
“because they were unpracticed in labors.” 
Alasdair MacIntyre departs from other critics of modernity—including Adrian Vermeule, 
Patrick Deneen, and to a lesser extent, Pierre Manent—because, in his attempt to retrieve the 
resources of pre-modernity, he prioritizes the importance of learning from the “labors” of its less 
than perfect account of the human good in order to choose wisely in the post-modern present. Like 
those interlocutors, MacIntyre rejects the idea that there is any value neutrality inherent in 
liberalism, a suggestion MacIntyre has found misguided from his Marxist days onward.3 However, 
unlike other critics of modernity, he affirms the separation of the state from visions of the good 
life: “For the contemporary state could not adopt a point of view on the human good as its own 
without to a significant degree distorting, degrading, and discrediting that point of view. It would 
put those values to the service of its own political and economic power and so degrade and discredit 
87  Bagnulo 
  
them.” As examples, MacIntyre points to two regimes whose hegemony rested on the power of 
the Roman Catholic Church: Franco’s Spain and de Valera’s Ireland.4 
In this essay, I argue that MacIntyre’s thinking rescues us from reactionary, anti-liberal strains 
of contemporary political thought and contemporary politics that do not know how to 
accommodate viewpoint diversity in the ethical life. In order to establish this claim, first, I briefly 
review what I call the “After Virtue Project,” in which I present what is distinctive about 
MacIntyre’s critique of liberalism. Then, I turn to the role of conflict in Ethics in the Conflicts of 
Modernity. MacIntyre draws attention in this work to what many contemporary critics of 
modernity do not want to admit. Conflicts about the final human good are “interminable,” or as he 
says elsewhere in this work “philosophical theories are only rarely, if ever, refutable by knock-
down arguments.”5 
MacIntyre’s decision to make his latest, and perhaps last, major contribution to philosophy an 
explanation of the role that conflict plays in the ethical life provides his most complete answer to 
what the St. Benedict he urged us to wait for in After Virtue looks like. For MacIntyre, Benedict 
does not escape the world or withdraw from modernity in the face of conflict, but takes it in and 
responds to it. Conflict appears on at least three levels in MacIntyre’s thought. There is the familiar 
conflict within us, namely, the conflict that our (sometimes warring) desires might cause. There is 
conflict that we encounter in the form of obstacles presented by events, society, or other persons. 
Finally, there is the conflict among traditions that currently manifests in the apparently 
interminable disagreements of modernity. The flourishing of the Aristotelian/Thomistic tradition 
itself is indebted to conflict, whether it be the kind of productive conflict evidenced by Thomas’s 
synthesis of Aristotle, his Islamic interpreters, St. Paul, and Augustine,6 or the uncoupling of many 
of Aristotle’s benighted prejudices from the structure of his thought.7 
 
2. The “After Virtue Project” as a Unique Critique of Modernity 
Recently, Patrick Deneen has provocatively argued that liberalism fails precisely through the 
achievement of its goals. In Why Liberalism Failed, Deneen claims that, “[a]s liberalism has 
‘become more fully itself’ […], it has generated pathologies that are at once deformations of its 
claims yet realizations of liberal ideology.”8 
Deneen explicitly acknowledges that any anti-liberal political program must admit liberalism’s 
accomplishments and refrain from proposing any simple return to the past.9 In this way, he 
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resembles MacIntyre. However, as an example of the political arrangement he envisions, Deneen 
endorses the kinds of small communities detailed in Rod Dreher’s Benedict Option, a book named 
after MacIntyre’s invocation of St. Benedict at the end of After Virtue.10 By contrast, MacIntyre 
has distanced himself from the Benedict Option as an interpretation of his political project.11 
Further, whatever regime MacIntyre envisions as fitting, he emphasizes, as we have seen, the 
importance of some amount of state neutrality when it comes to the question of the good life: 
 
So by a very different route we have arrived at very much the same conclusion as 
that reached both by classical liberals and by modern liberals: the state must not be 
allowed to impose any one particular conception of the human good or identify one 
such conception with its own interests and causes. It must afford tolerance to a 
diversity of standpoints. But liberals generally have arrived at these conclusions 
because they believe either that the state ought to be neutral between different rival 
conceptions of the good or that states ought actively to promote the liberty and 
autonomy of individuals in making their own choices. I have argued by contrast 
first that the contemporary state is not and cannot be evaluatively neutral, and 
secondly that it is just because of the ways in which the state is not evaluatively 
neutral that it cannot generally be trusted to promote any worthwhile set of values, 
including those of autonomy and liberty.12 
 
For MacIntyre, it seems, learning from modernity involves cultivating a modicum of the 
institutional neutrality that Deneen sees as fundamentally disruptive of good politics. 
Like Deneen, Adrian Vermeule shares with MacIntyre a concern for the ravages of the market 
on society, yet unlike Deneen he also shares with MacIntyre an interest in conflict. More radical 
than Deneen, Vermeule claims that all conflict is ultimately “theological.” Consequently, 
liberalism’s most primary problem is “that its anti-authoritarian ethos of belief, its compulsion to 
celebrate the overcoming of political rule, is ultimately inconsistent with its own claim to rule.” 
Liberalism cannot recognize that it is itself “sacramental,”13 requiring a faith in its authority that 
its privileging of intellectual skepticism conceals. 
Unlike Deneen, Vermeule envisions a politics much more imperial in its scope, welcoming the 
“providential” fact that liberalism, despite itself, has prepared a state capable of great tasks, as a 
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legacy to bequeath to a new and doubtless very different future. According to Vermeule, “The vast 
bureaucracy created by liberalism in pursuit of a mirage of depoliticized governance may, by the 
invisible hand of Providence, be turned to new ends, becoming the great instrument with which to 
restore a substantive politics of the good.”14 Such a politics turns to the ragion di stato tradition 
studied by Carl Schmitt, a tradition the aim of which “was to elaborate natural principles by which 
a ruler could secure the threefold hallmarks of common good, ‘abundance, peace, and justice,’ and 
thereby secure his own ‘firm rule over people’—Giovanni Botero’s famous definition of the 
‘state.’”15 
With the most nuance of the alternative critics of modernity we are considering, Pierre Manent 
characterizes the modern experiment as lacking the ability to satisfy the deepest human longings, 
in part because it privileges equality too greatly. According to Manent, the political needs glory to 
thrive16—the kind of glory that is incompatible with the humility privileged by MacIntyre in his 
account of Aquinas.17 Notably, Manent accuses MacIntyre of being insufficiently political,18 
which reflects a difference between the men on the role of humility in politics—a difference that 
is evident in MacIntyre’s critique of the megalopsychos, the magnanimous man.19 Modernity, 
according to Manent, suffers from the fact that it suppresses the two greatest human inclinations: 
the desire for the transcendent, embodied most perfectly by the church as an empire, and the desire 
for the “common thing,” or the political, particularly as represented by the ancient Greek polis.20 
The suppression of these impulses is a symptom of one of modernity’s primary aims: the triumph 
of the many over the few.21 
Like other critics of liberalism, MacIntyre views modern morality as frustrating many of human 
being’s most fundamental longings. However, unlike other critics, he recognizes the extent to 
which practices that form virtues are instantiations of times and places, and that it is difficult to 
disentangle pre-modern political enterprises from their prejudices.22 It turns out that the conflict 
that occurs when rival conceptions of the good, in theory or in practice, clash is part of what enables 
the separation of prudence from prejudice. This ability to balance the universal and the particular 
makes MacIntyre more subtle than other critics of modernity. 
Moved by the question of the apparently interminable philosophical conflict of the 
contemporary world, MacIntyre undertook a fuller description of what the After Virtue thesis 
entails, defending and modifying his work.23 Through this inquiry, he embraced Thomistic 
Aristotelianism. Yet once he recognized the answers to the questions posed in After Virtue in 
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Aquinas’s work, he was confronted with a difficulty: How does one persuade a hostile world, what 
he calls “the culture of advanced modernity,” to accept a moral philosophy toward which it bears 
nothing but animosity? And how does one make a philosophy that is situated in a particular 
historical and cultural context translatable to a different time? For answers, he turned to the process 
of his own philosophical inquiry. 
Consequently, MacIntyre’s work since 1981 may be divided into a diagnostic phase, where he 
examines contemporary moral philosophy as undergoing an epistemological crisis, and a 
prescriptive phase, where he responds to this epistemological crisis using the resources of his own 
philosophical journey, traditional Thomism, and the most salient points of the Nietzschean 
critique. The subsequent “After Virtue Project” attempts to rescue not just moral philosophy, but 
the world of “plain persons,” from the disaster MacIntyre perceives in the culture of advanced 
modernity. 
In After Virtue, MacIntyre argues that “in the actual world which we inhabit the language of 
morality is in [… a] state of grave disorder.”24 The reader famously comes to a crossroads. 
Nietzsche correctly questions the obligatory nature of a morality of rules, rather than a morality of 
fulfillment. Yet, if the Aristotelian conception of reason and telos is recoverable, Nietzsche is not 
right to suppose morality is dead along with God. One must concede either that the Enlightenment 
era’s rejection of Aristotelianism was misguided, or that morality is just a matter of perspective. 
MacIntyre decidedly opts for the former. After Virtue famously concludes with the invocation of 
“another St. Benedict” and a call to readers, both plain and learned, to launch a “stubborn, 
persevering, and hopeful but realistic effort to re-create in adverse social and political 
circumstances the perennial conditions for the good life.”25 
MacIntyre’s adherence to Aristotelian Thomism is earliest dated at 1985, but the seeds of his 
contemporary theoretical position are present from his youth. His concern for incommensurability 
grew out of his early experience of the world as a reflective young man caught between warring 
traditions. A capacity for belief as well as a capacity for negative critique is evident within his 
account of his intellectual life. He spent his youth immersed in a strong Gaelic oral tradition that 
emphasized the importance of roles, loyalty, and narrative. In contrast, he simultaneously 
experienced a culture of “bourgeois” values, competitive learning, and worldly success.26 Plato’s 
philosophy persuaded him to abhor contradiction, but at the same time his undergraduate studies 
increased his inability to think within one coherent tradition. Though he had formerly embraced 
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Christianity on some level, he could no longer sustain belief in God. Once incapable of thinking 
within the confines of a unified tradition, the dictates of faith appeared arbitrary and purposeless.27 
At first lights, the constraints of a particular mode of thought as lived and experienced by 
particular groups can appear destructive to independent thinking, yet MacIntyre’s personal 
experience of confusion and incommensurability led him to embrace traditions of inquiry later on 
in his career. It is also very possible that the appeal of a unified tradition drew him to his first meta-
narrative, Marxism. His struggle with Marxism exposed for him the weaknesses of closed systems 
of thought and emphasized the importance of listening and responding to critics.28 
 
3. Productive Conflict and the Role of Desire 
I have noted that MacIntyre considers productive conflict an important catalyst for right human 
judgment, in contrast to other critics of liberalism. Like the soul in Plato’s myth of Er who chooses 
the life of the tyrant because his desire was never transformed through “labors,” critics of 
modernity whose inquiry stops at depicting it as a destroyer of virtue or greatness overlook the 
importance of embedding themselves in practices of enquiry that can disentangle what is perennial 
about human desire from what is only conventional and even from what is “masked” by human 
desire as truth.29 
Doing so requires asking deeper questions about what desires for the good modernity seeks to 
satisfy, how our particular contexts condition those desires, and how the desires influence our 
ability to think about what is good. It also requires asking how pre-modern phases of Western 
development failed to account for, or even possibly distorted, human desires. An important part of 
that process of inquiry is beginning to ask in what ways systems of thought are responses to human 
desire, even while they create and condition human desire. On this view Marxism, liberalism, and 
what MacIntyre refers to as “Morality” are all attempts to answer human desire that end up 
disfiguring or repressing it.30 
How does engaging in the conflict of traditions of inquiry lead to the transformation of desire 
that enable to us to move toward wisdom in understanding the good life? MacIntyre identifies 
three phases: the rehearsal of objections from other traditions, the reply to objections from other 
traditions (and if necessary the synthesis of what is useful in those traditions to one’s own), and 
the presentation of how one’s tradition better satisfies the concerns expressed by the original 
objection.31 According to MacIntyre, an important part of the ethics of politics is to create the 
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conditions for the practices and enquiries that shape and educate desire and help us to pose our 
questions in wise ways. These conditions are necessarily open to conflict if they are to remain 
healthy. On this account, conflict is constitutive of truth in inquiry and practice. If there is such a 
thing as the primary precepts of natural law, explaining why it is the case that the discovery and 
practice of these precepts is so difficult in modernity is essential. Aquinas himself considered such 
failure “rare and exceptional,” but it is clear that moral disagreement is extensive and characteristic 
of modernity.32 
The dynamic nature of inquiry about the good comports with MacIntyre’s characterization of 
tradition as “an argument extended through time in which certain fundamental arguments are 
defined and redefined in terms of two kinds of conflict,” internal conflict between adherents of the 
same tradition and external conflict with critics.33 Traditions of inquiry are not merely theoretical, 
because every articulation of the human good (even the ones that suggest there is no human good) 
requires imagining “what allegiance to it amounts to or would amount to in practice.”34 It is often 
in questions of practice that members of disparate traditions bump up against one another, because 
their disagreements about practice may reflect deeper disagreements about the good. 
How communities respond to such conflict is essential not just to social stability but to the 
health of traditions themselves. Communities that experience disagreement must conduct their 
conflict in such a way that they avoid two pitfalls: (1) the “evil of suppression, of thinking that one 
has avoided conflict by somehow depriving one party to it of the means for expressing its attitudes, 
concerns and arguments”; and (2) the “evil of disruption,” such that any possibility for shared 
deliberation is precluded. “Sometimes,” MacIntyre comments, “one of these evils is produced by 
those who are attempting to avoid the other.”35 Pointedly, the upshot is that even for adherents of 
a given tradition there is no philosophical “last word,” so to speak.36 Even the Aristotelian Thomist 
convinced of modern philosophy’s paucity must anticipate and be open to further challenges. 
 
4. Conclusion 
For MacIntyre, critics of liberalism must “act against modernity within modernity.”37 An 
empathetic anti-liberal, learning from Aquinas’s approach to conflict between traditions, will seek 
to understand her interlocutors in their own terms. Accordingly, the critic of liberalism who has 
learned to engage with rival traditions will see in modernity’s attempt to sever the good from the 
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political a claim about the failure of authorities (political, religious, or otherwise) to practice the 
good. 
Let us close by considering an example. Recently, MacIntyre discussed in a conference 
presentation what the anti-liberal has to learn from the political and social changes in the Republic 
of Ireland, as symbolized by its 2018 legalization of abortion. As he remarks, “The most prominent 
advocates for retaining the ban on abortion were of course the Catholic bishops and other 
representatives of the Church, but the greatest and most scandalous failures of the Catholic Church 
in Ireland—and of course not only in Ireland—have been its failures to care for children.”38 
In Ireland, those failures included not only sexual abuse, but also physical abuse and neglect in 
orphanages and homes for unwed mothers. While the Church claimed to care for children, and to 
oppose abortion out of such care, MacIntyre suggests not only that the Church’s failures made 
legal abortion possible, but that they also contributed decisively to Ireland’s relatively late 
secularization. The religious authorities’ failure to practice the good they taught made the moral 
claims of the Church “unintelligible” to the plain person, who now had “an excellent reason for 
regarding the culture of the Church with deep suspicion.” Instead of subordinating some forms of 
desire to the authority of the Church in the hope that the desire would be “formed,” the majority 
of Irish people rejected the authority of the Church to form their desire. 
Here is the point. Instead of viewing Ireland’s embrace of abortion as strictly an outgrowth of 
modernity’s “mythic” assertion of neutrality, or as evidence of the need to unite Church and state 
to control human desire, MacIntyre casts it as a problem of authority behaving badly and thus 
losing its legitimacy. The Church in Ireland failed to attend to its internal problems. Internal 
conflict should not have been suppressed; it would have been so very much healthier. 
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